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Abstract: 
Focuses on the cooperation between British and Japanese naval forces in World War I 
(WWI) from 1914 to 1918. Historical account of Japanese involvement in WWI as a 
jackal state; Accounts on the Japanese naval assistance to allied operations in the 
Mediterranean Sea; Alliance of Japan with Great Britain to pursue an expansionist policy 
designed to increase territorial gains. 
 
ANGLO-JAPANESE NAVAL 
COOPERATION, 1914-1918  
The captain of the attacking submarine achieved complete surprise with his bold midday 
maneuver near Crete. Stealing to within two hundred meters of an unwary convoy escort, he 
fired at point-blank range. His torpedo ran true, striking the destroyer between its forward stacks 
and severing the vessel's bow. Its unlucky crew, packed into the crowded mess for the noonday 
meal, suffered horrific losses. The explosion and consequent inferno claimed sixty-seven 
members of the ship's company and its commander. Despite heavy damage, however, the 
battered warship survived and later reached port in Piraeus, Greece.[ 1]  
At first glance, the 11 June 1917 attack by the U-2 7 on an allied destroyer operating off the 
Greek coast appears unremarkable among the countless similar engagements of the First World 
War at sea. Nonetheless, the identities of these two combatants still startle observers more than 
eighty years later. First, it was an Austro-Hungarian submarine that torpedoed the allied 
destroyer; the Austro-Hungarian Navy challenged allied naval supremacy in the Mediterranean 
Sea throughout the First World War. The identity of the destroyer is even more astonishing--the 
U-27's victim was the Sakaki, a warship of the Imperial Japanese Navy.  
Japan rendered vital, worldwide naval support to Great Britain during the First World War, 
culminating in the service of Japan's first and only Mediterranean squadron. This long-forgotten 
Japanese flotilla fought alongside allied warships throughout the most critical period of the 
struggle against German and Austro-Hungarian U-boats in 1917 and 1918.  
Japanese cooperation is all the more surprising given that both British and American historians 
have characterized Japan's role in the First World War as that of a "jackal state," one that took a 
lion's share of the kill after only minimally assisting the cause.[ 2] The record tells a different 
story. Japan in fact stretched its naval resources to the limit during the First World War. Japanese 
naval assistance in the Mediterranean Sea in 1917 boosted the strength of allied naval escorts 
during the darkest days of the war. Beyond the Mediterranean, an argument can be made that 
without Japanese assistance Great Britain would have lost control of the Pacific and Indian 
Oceans. That would have isolated the British Empire's two dominions in the Far East, Australia 
and New Zealand, from the campaigns in Europe and the Middle East. Other British colonies, 
from Aden and India to Singapore and Hong Kong, would have been exposed. Despite this help, 
Japan, at best a mistrusted and suspect ally of Great Britain in 1914, emerged from the conflict 
feared and despised by its "friends."  
A more balanced view of Japan's role does not overlook the gains garnered by Japan for its 
exertions. It argues, though, that Japanese gains were commensurate with its efforts and in 
keeping with the diplomatic understandings that had existed at the beginning of the war. Japan 
did not participate in the First World War for altruistic reasons--but then neither did Great 
Britain, France, Italy, or Russia. The concessions Japan received in China and the broadening of 
its Pacific empire were no more than comparable to the gains made by Great Britain, France, 
Italy, and Britain's Pacific dominions. Japan participated in the war as an ally of Great Britain 
while simultaneously pursuing an expansionist policy designed to maximize its territorial gains 
in China and the Pacific islands. In the event, Japan's acquisitions were unquestionably in line 
with the sacrifices it made and the assistance it rendered to its allies during the conflict.  
At the end of the war, Japanese wartime diplomacy did not take on the Wilsonian, idealistic 
modes that Western leaders by then espoused.[ 3] The Japanese discovered that the new idealism 
did not apply when it came to affirming (in the Treaty of Versailles) racial equality or equal 
opportunities for expansion. The British and Americans resisted Japanese expansion before, 
during, and after the First World War, out of fear of competition in the Pacific and racial hatred 
of the proud, at times arrogant, Japanese.  
How did the Imperial Japanese Navy cooperate with the Royal Navy during the First World 
War? Although the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902 did not require it, Japan declared it would 
support Britain in the war against Germany and sent an ultimatum to Berlin demanding 
withdrawal of German warships from Japanese and Chinese waters. Japan helped establish 
control of the Pacific and Indian Oceans early in the war by seizing the German fortress and 
naval base of Tsingtao and Germany's colonies in the Pacific (the Carolines, Marshalls, and most 
of the Mariana islands); Japanese naval forces also aided Great Britain in driving German 
warships from the Pacific. At the outbreak of the war, Vice Admiral Maximilian Graf von Spee 
commanded six cruisers of the German Far Eastern Squadron at Ponape in the Carolines; the 
Japanese declaration of war compelled him to lead most of his force east to South America and 
the battles of Coronel and the Falklands. The Japanese navy maintained allied control of Far 
Eastern and Indian waters throughout the war, assuming responsibility for patrolling them when 
demands on British naval forces exceeded resources, and in 1917 freeing American naval forces 
for service in Europe. Japanese forces provided escorts for convoying troops and war materials 
to the European theater of operations from the British dominions in the Far East. Japan built 
warships for allied nations and sold merchant shipping to the allies during the war when their 
shipyards, already working at maximum effort, could not meet such needs. Finally, Japan 
rendered direct naval assistance in the Mediterranean Sea in 1917 and 1918 when the allied 
navies faced the prospect of abandoning that sea in the face of the Central Powers' increasingly 
successful submarine operations.  
The Origins of British Naval Dependence on Japan  
The Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902 resulted from the threat that Russia presented to both states 
by its moves toward India, Korea, and Manchuria.[ 4] As the alliance matured, Winston 
Churchill (from 1911), like his predecessors as First Lord of the Admiralty, pursued a naval 
policy envisioning that the outbreak of a general war in Europe would require Japanese 
assistance in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. As tensions between Great Britain and Germany 
increased with the Russo-Japanese War of 1905, British naval strength underwent a 
reorganization that saw the Channel, Atlantic, and Mediterranean forces' battleship strength 
increased at the expense of those in the Pacific Ocean. What had been an anti-Russian 
disposition of British naval forces tilted decisively toward an anti-German alignment after the 
Russo-Japanese conflict.[ 5]  
Churchill, almost from the day he took the helm as First Lord in October 1911, accelerated the 
withdrawal of battleships from the Mediterranean and China seas and their redeployment against 
the growing naval power of Wilhelmine Germany in the North Sea.[ 6] By March 1914, British 
naval strength in the Far East had decreased from five battleships and an armored cruiser in 
March 1904 to two battleships, a battle cruiser, and two cruisers.[ 7]  
In March 1914, Churchill, arguing for his policy in the House of Commons, acknowledged that 
defeat of the main British naval force in European waters would leave a small force of Pacific-
based dreadnoughts vulnerable. Any British naval force in Far Eastern waters must inevitably be 
inferior to the main fleet of a European rival. On the other hand, Churchill pointed out, "two or 
three 'Dreadnoughts'" in Australian waters "would be useless the day after the defeat of the 
British Navy in Home waters."[ 8]  
This policy produced a growing naval dependence on Britain's allies. France took up the slack in 
the Mediterranean, and Japan assumed a correspondingly larger role in the defense of the China 
Seas.[ 9] With France, this policy worked well, as the British attempted to settle outstanding 
colonial problems with that nation and afterwards participated in the creation of the Entente 
Cordiale.  
No such reservoir of good will existed between Japan and Great Britain; preexisting tension 
concerning Japan's imperial ambitions tested relations throughout the First World War. The 
strains ultimately contributed to the collapse of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Japanese expansion 
beyond Manchuria during 1913 and 1914 increased the deep suspicion of Japanese intentions on 
the part of the British foreign secretary, Sir Edward Grey.  
Grey opposed any Japanese participation in the war, fearing that Japan would see an opportunity 
to expand beyond reasonable bounds.[ 10] In the teeth of Admiralty objections, therefore, he 
worked to prevent Japan's entry into a European conflict as the situation worsened throughout 
the summer of 1914. On 1 August, Grey notified his counterpart in Tokyo, Kato Takaaki[*], that 
Great Britain would require Japanese assistance only if Germany attacked its Far Eastern 
colonies or fighting spread into the Far East. Grey worried not only about Japanese expansion 
into the German colonies in China and the Pacific Ocean but also that Australia, New Zealand, 
and the United States would strongly oppose apparent British support of that expansion. In the 
end, German steps to mobilize reserves at the key port of Tsingtao and to disperse warships into 
the Pacific, along with the aggressive First Lord's insistence on expanding the war against 
German naval forces worldwide, forced Grey's hand.[ 11]  
On 11 August 1914, Churchill, worried by what he considered Grey's clumsy attempts to prevent 
Japanese entry into the war, or limit Japanese action once in it, warned the foreign secretary:  
I think you are chilling indeed to these people. I can't see any halfway house between having 
them in and keeping them out. If they are to come in, they may as well be welcomed as 
comrades. This last telegram [to Japan] is almost hostile. I am afraid I do not understand what is 
in yr mind on this aspect--tho' I followed it so clearly till today.  
... This telegram gives me a shiver. We are all in this together & I only wish to give the fullest 
effect & support to your main policy. But I am altogether perplexed by the line opened up by 
these Japanese interchanges.  
You may easily give mortal offence--wh will not be forgotten--we are not safe yet--by a long 
chalk. The storm has yet to burst.[ 12]  
Churchill's remonstrance helped to alter Grey's opposition to Japan's full participation in the war.  
The Japanese government of Prince Yamagata Aritomo delivered an ultimatum on 15 August 
1914 requiring the dismantling of German power in Pacific. The demarche demanded that 
German naval vessels either leave or surrender at Kiaochow and that Germany allow the 
destruction of fortifications there and surrender to Japan the Shantung Peninsula. Japanese 
demands also included that the German islands scattered throughout the Pacific be turned over to 
Japan. The Germans made no response, and Japan formally declared war on 23 August 1914.[ 
13]  
Strong evidence existed that justified Grey's fears of Japanese ambitions. One was the substantial 
size of Japan's navy (see Table 1). The Japanese clearly entered the war in large part to increase 
their prestige among the great powers and to expand their holdings in China and the Pacific. 
Moreover, Japanese officials had chafed under several unequal treaties imposed after the 
Western opening of the country in the 1850s.[ 14] Still, such motives for participation in the war 
were no better or worse than those secretly advanced at the start of World War I by other 
belligerents. What truly upset Japan's Western allies was their inability to act in a paternalistic 
fashion toward what they considered an inferior. Hostile views of Japan prevailed at the 
beginning of the war, and they did not diminish during the struggle despite Japan's help for its 
allies. In fact, such antipathy increased as Japan dared to act as any Western state would have 
done. This racial animosity is a reason why the institutional memory of the extensive assistance 
that Japan rendered to the allied cause during the war was so short-lived. Such memories were 
inconvenient for the account of the war that anti-Japanese groups in Great Britain and the United 
States wished to perpetuate.  
The Joint Expedition against Tsingtao  
Wartime Anglo-Japanese cooperation in the Far East opened on a sour note. Immediately upon 
entry into the war, Japan moved to secure the Kiaochow or Shantung Peninsula, known as the 
"German Gibraltar of the East" (Map 1). The peninsula, where lay the German naval base at 
Tsingtao (modern Qingdao, on Kiaochow Bay), served as the peacetime station for the German 
Far Eastern squadron. Preparing for its capture, Kato informed his British allies that Japan would 
return Tsingtao to China after conquest, but only at a price. He also intimated that Japan did not 
require British support for the operation, but Grey ignored that and sent the South Wales 
Borderers and a detachment of Sikh troops under Brigadier General N. W. Barnardiston to join 
the assault. A small British squadron participated in the blockade of Kiaochow Bay, which began 
on 27 August.[ 15]  
The Anglo-Japanese expedition arrived off Tsingtao on the 26th. Major and modern units of the 
German fleet had evacuated Tsingtao in the days preceding the Japanese declaration of war, 
leaving only the antiquated Austro-Hungarian armored cruiser Kaiserin Elisabeth, five gunboats, 
and two destroyers.[ 16] The weakness of the German vessels allowed the Japanese navy to use 
older ships; the Japanese blockaded Tsingtao harbor with three obsolete, ex-Russian battleships, 
two ex-Russian coastal-defense ships, seven cruisers, sixteen destroyers, and fourteen support 
ships. The battleship Triumph, a destroyer, and a hospital ship formed the British contribution to 
the blockading fleet.[ 17]  
Vice Admiral Baron Kamimura Hikonojo's Second Fleet transported Japanese and British troops 
to China to conduct the siege. The initial Japanese landing occurred at Lungkow (modern Long 
Kou) on 2 September. A naval landing force captured Lau Shau Bay, northeast of Tsingtao, on 
18 September, for use as a forward base for further operations against Tsingtao. British troops 
entered China via other routes on 24 September.[ 18]  
The Anglo-Japanese naval force maintained a tight blockade of the Tsingtao harbor while 
clearing mines and providing to allied ground forces vital intelligence collected by the Japanese 
tender Wakamiya's seaplanes. The Wakamiya's aircraft are also credited with conducting at this 
time "the first successful carrier air raid in history," sinking a German minelayer at Tsingtao. 
Throughout the siege, troops ashore called upon naval gunfire support and Japanese seaplanes to 
bombard enemy positions.[ 19]  
The Japanese navy suffered a serious loss and embarrassment on 18 October, when the old 
German torpedo boat 5-90 evaded destroyers guarding the harbor and sank the antiquated cruiser 
Yakachiyo with two torpedoes. The S-90 had escaped the notice of patrolling destroyers by 
waiting for them to reach the far end of the harbor entrance, then running out at high speed and 
surprising the second line of ships, a destroyer leader and older Japanese cruisers. The Imperial 
Japanese Navy also lost the destroyer Shirotae, a torpedo boat, and three minesweeping vessels 
in the process of capturing Tsingtao, with a total of 317 personnel killed and seventy-six 
wounded, the majority in the sinking of the Takachiyo.[ 20]  
The German garrison of 3,500 regulars and 2,500 reservists, joined by the entire crew of the 
Kaiserin Elisabeth, mounted a vigorous defense of Tsingtao. Nonetheless, the Japanese kept 
British ground forces from playing an active role in the campaign.[ 21] The combined German 
and Austro-Hungarian force surrendered on 7 November 1914, when the Japanese fought their 
way into Tsingtao. The British contingent, deliberately excluded from Japanese plans, learned of 
the assault only after the fact.[ 22] German and Austro-Hungarian prisoners taken in Tsingtao 
spent the remainder of the war in Japan. The Japanese army reported losses of 414 killed and 
1,441 wounded in taking the German citadel.[ 23]  
The Japanese retained control of Tsingtao and steadily expanded their grip over the Shantung 
Peninsula, occupying the German railroad running through the region. Thus the effective result 
of the first Anglo-Japanese operation of the war was the establishment of Japanese control over 
large areas of Manchuria; mistrust between the two states sharply increased.[ 24]  
Japanese Patrols and Escorts  
While Admiral Kamimura's Second Fleet was aiding in the conquest of Tsingtao, ships of the 
First Fleet joined with British, French, and Australian ships in driving von Spee's roving cruiser 
squadron from the Pacific. Immediately upon the outbreak of war, Vice Admiral Tamin Yamaya 
sent the battleship Kongo toward Midway to patrol sea lines of communication and ordered the 
cruiser Izumo, then off the coast of Mexico, to defend allied shipping there. On 26 August he 
detached the battle cruiser Ibuki and cruiser Chikuma to Singapore to help allied forces in that 
region.[ 25] The Chikuma unsuccessfully searched the Dutch East Indies and the Bay of Bengal 
as far as Colombo, Ceylon (Sri Lanka) for the German cruiser Eraden.[ 26] Admiral Matsumura 
Tatsuo, with the battleship Satsuma and cruisers Yahagi and Hirado, patrolled sea routes to 
Australia searching for German raiders.[ 27]  
More pressing duties soon diverted the Ibuki from Singapore. Responding to the attacks by the 
German cruiser Emden on allied Indian Ocean shipping, the Ibuki dashed across the South 
Pacific to Wellington, New Zealand. On 16 October it conducted the first of what would be 
many voyages wherein Japanese warships escorted Australian-New Zealand Army Corps 
(ANZAC) troops to the Middle East.[ 28] The Ibuki and other Japanese warships were to 
accompany ANZAC troops as far west as Aden on the Red Sea throughout the war.[ 29] Other 
Japanese units escorted French troopships sailing from the Far East to reinforce units fighting on 
the western front.[ 30] (Although the Australian and New Zealand troop convoy did not 
encounter the Emden, a radio report from the Cocos Islands led to the detachment of the 
Australian cruiser HMAS Sydney from the escort. Near those isolated isles, the Sydney surprised 
the Emden and destroyed the raider by gunfire after forcing it onto the reefs.)[ 31]  
Also during October, Japanese naval forces under the command of Vice Admiral Tochinai Sojiro 
reinforced British units searching the Indian Ocean for German raiders. Tochinai ultimately 
employed the cruisers Tokiwa, Yakumo, Ibuki, Nisshin, Chikuma, Hirado, Yahagi, and Ikoma, 
plus part of the British fleet, in hunting down the raiders.[ 32] On 1 November 1914, the 
Japanese navy agreed to a British request to assume all patrols in the Indian Ocean east of ninety 
degrees east longitude. Much of Admiral Tochinai's force, and other warships withdrawn from 
Tsingtao, guarded this area for the remainder of the month.[ 33] In addition, after the German 
warship Geier's appearance at the neutral port of Honolulu on 15 October 1914, the battleship 
Hizen and cruiser Asama took up positions off that port until the American government interned 
the Geier on 7 November. The Hizen and Asama then joined the Izumo off the coast of South 
America and swept those waters for German warships.[ 34]  
The employment of Japanese ships provoked a mixed response from the governments of 
Australia and New Zealand. They fully endorsed using Japanese ships as escorts for troop 
convoys but sharply disapproved when in late 1914 the Japanese First Fleet seized the German 
colonies of the Marshall, Mariana, and Caroline Islands (see Map 2).[ 35] Tamin's forces took 
Jaluit in the Marshall Islands on 4 October, sailing from there to seize the superb harbor at Truk 
in the Carolines on 12 October. A second force under Rear Admiral Tatsuo Matsumura captured 
the German port of Rabaul, on New Britain, on 1 October. It continued on 7 October to Yap, 
where it encountered the German vessel Planet. The crew of the Planet scuttled the vessel rather 
than have it fall into Japanese hands, and the Japanese captured Yap without further incident. 
The Japanese navy stationed four warships at Suva in the Fiji Islands and six at Truk for patrol 
operations in late 1914.[ 36]  
The British and Japanese governments reached a tentative arrangement in late 1914 concerning 
the captured German possessions in the Pacific Ocean. The Japanese now held the Marianas, 
Carolines, and the MarshalIs, as well as Yap. Australian forces had taken New Guinea and 
nearby territories. Troops from New Zealand, just beating Japanese forces to Samoa, now held a 
firm grip on the strategic island. Rather than risk an incident that might lead to a confrontation, 
the British agreed that thenceforth forces of the Empire would seize no German territories north 
of the equator.[ 37]  
In 1914 the Royal Navy could ill afford to offend its strongest ally in the Pacific. Faced with 
worldwide responsibilities defending British trade and possessions, it sought direct Japanese 
involvement in the European theater of operations from the beginning of the war. Sir Edward 
Grey issued the first formal appeal for Japanese naval assistance on 6 August 1914. It resulted in 
the previously mentioned deployment of Japanese naval units to Singapore. On two further 
occasions in 1914, British appeals for deployments of Japanese naval forces to the Mediterranean 
and the Baltic met with rejection.[ 38]  
Internal politics throughout the Meiji period gave the Army greater political power in 
government councils than the Navy ever enjoyed. Although the Navy's position had strengthened 
somewhat in the Yammato cabinet, which left office in April 1914, the balance of power in the 
succeeding Okuma cabinet allowed the Army to veto the deployment of naval units to the 
European theater of operations in November 1914. Conflict between Great Britain and Germany, 
which had trained, respectively, the Navy and Army, led to a difference of opinion between the 
two services. The Prussian-trained Army sympathized with the German-led Central Powers, 
while the Navy, trained by and modeled after the Royal Navy, supported Britain and the 
Entente.[ 39] This conflict of loyalties dogged the Japanese government throughout the war in its 
attempts to aid Great Britain.[ 40]  
Japanese warships rendered a new form of assistance to Great Britain in February 1915, when 
they helped to suppress a revolt by Indian soldiers stationed in Singapore. Admiral Tsuchiya 
Mitsukane's warships, the old cruisers Tsushima and Otowa, landed marines, who joined with 
British, French, and Russian forces in quelling the rising.[ 41] Also in 1915, the Imperial 
Japanese Navy committed many units to help hunt down the German cruiser Dresden and for 
such other tasks as guarding against the escape of German shipping that had taken refuge in the 
port of Manila. Japanese warships operating from Singapore guarded the South China Sea, Sulu 
Sea, and Dutch East Indies throughout the year.[ 42]  
Sir Edward Grey again requested Japanese aid in February 1916. In that month, the destruction 
of shipping by mines secretly laid by German auxiliary cruisers led to an increase in the number 
of ships deployed for antiraider patrols. This time the Japanese government dispatched a 
destroyer flotilla to Singapore to guard the vital Malacca Straits and a cruiser division to the 
Indian Ocean for patrol duties.[ 43] Ships of the Japanese Third Fleet began patrol operations in 
the Indian Ocean and in the Philippine Islands near Luzon. The cruisers Yahagi, Suma, Niitaka, 
and Tsushima, accompanied by a squadron of destroyers, initiated patrols in the South China 
Sea, Sulu Sea, Dutch East Indies, and Indian Ocean. Several units maintained a presence off 
Mauritius and South Africa, and the Chikuma and Hirato journeyed to Australia and New 
Zealand to escort vessels transiting the area.[ 44]  
"Japan Is Not Taking a Full Share"  
Despite such widespread deployment of Japanese units to protect allied shipping, at the end of 
1916 Admiral John Jellicoe, commanding the Grand Fleet, expressed the British skepticism 
about Japanese intentions in a revealing missive to Admiral David Beatty, who commanded 
Jellicoe's battle cruiser squadron. He described Japan's conduct in the war thus far as not 
"entirely satisfactory." While allowing for the idea that mutual antipathy between Japan and the 
United States had prevented more help from the Japanese, he voiced the suspicion that the 
Japanese harbored the idea of creating a "greater Japan which will probably comprise parts of 
China and the Gateway to the East, the Dutch East Indies, Singapore, and the Malay States." He 
faulted the Japanese government for operating under the mistaken belief that the "German 
military machine was invincible"; recent German losses at the Somme and Verdun, he felt, 
would correct this impression. His statement that "apart from the selling of guns and ammunition 
to the Russians and ourselves, Japan is not taking a full share of the war," accurately depicted the 
growing resentment in Great Britain of Japan's unwillingness to join operations in the European 
theater.[ 45] His thinking paralleled that of other key British naval officers who spoke of the 
Japanese as "not to be trusted very far," even while requesting their assistance in the critical 
Mediterranean theater.[ 46]  
Seen through Japanese eyes, Japan's role in the First World War takes on a quite different 
appearance. Not only were the Japanese armed forces divided about which side to support, early 
in the conflict the average Japanese citizen hardly knew that Japan was at war at all. Lacking any 
sense of immediate danger to Japan emanating from Germany, most Japanese who were aware of 
the war found it unfathomable. While officially supporting the Entente, the Japanese government 
kept the war out of the limelight at home.[ 47]  
The wartime experience of a British officer in Japan illustrates this low-key approach to the 
conflict. In November 1917, a time when the Imperial Japanese Navy was engaged in operations 
in two oceans and the Mediterranean Sea, Malcolm Kennedy (a British army officer participating 
in an exchange program with the Japanese military) toured the Japanese countryside and 
discovered that the war was having no direct impact on the life of the average Japanese peasant. 
Stopping twice to speak with peasants, Kennedy was amazed to encounter complete disbelief 
when he told them that Japan was at war.  
They were frankly incredulous when I assured them, that not only was there a war, but that Japan 
was taking part in it. Their incredulity was based on the fact that the young men of the village 
had not been called up for service. If Japan was really at war, they argued, surely all the male 
youth of the country would be summoned to the colors.[ 48] That finally changed in 1918, when 
Japan experienced serious social dislocation as a result of the conflict. Wages had failed to keep 
pace with the inflation that had developed with the wartime prosperity. In August 1918, 
resentment of the new class of narikin--Japanese who prospered during the war--exploded in rice 
riots in Osaka, Kobe, and Nagoya.[ 49]  
Also complicating Japanese participation in the war was a slight to Japanese pride created by 
severe restrictions placed on Japanese physicians in Singapore. Also, the inferior status accorded 
Japan in trade agreements with Australia and New Zealand made full cooperation with the 
British and dominions difficult.[ 50]  
British requests for naval assistance in the European theater and the South Atlantic grew more 
insistent in late 1916 and early 1917 as the naval situation deteriorated in the Atlantic and the 
Mediterranean.[ 51] German raiders continued to operate effectively in the Indian Ocean, as 
documented by the successful voyage of the raider Wolf, which sank some 120,000 tons of allied 
shipping between 1916 and 1918 while tying down "a host of British, French, and Japanese naval 
craft ... in the fruitless hunt--21 cruisers, 14 destroyers, 9 sloops, etc."[ 52] The Japanese 
government responded by pressuring the British cabinet, which had dragged its feet in 
acknowledging Japanese claims to the Shantung Peninsula and the Pacific islands taken from the 
Germans, for recognition of these gains. Japanese officials argued to their British counterparts 
that in their desire to retain their conquests they were asking no more than the Russians, whom 
the allies were permitting to occupy Constantinople. The War Cabinet wrestled with the problem 
through January and February of 1917, worrying about the potential response of the dominions 
and of the Americans, who were edging closer to participation in the conflict,[ 53]  
The Japanese agreed in February 1917 to expand the patrols already protecting commerce in the 
Dutch East Indies, Sulu Sea, South China Sea, and Indian Ocean as far south as the Cape of 
Good Hope. The Japanese navy also increased its involvement in safeguarding commercial 
shipping off Australia's east coast and New Zealand. In this effort the cruisers Izumo, Nisshin, 
Tone, Niitaka, Akashi, Yakumo, Kasuga, Chikuma, Tsushima, Suma, Yodo, three squadrons of 
destroyers, and a "special duty flotilla" participated.[ 54]  
Japan also extended considerable help to the allied cause by supplying arms and shipping to its 
European friends. In 1914, the Japanese navy returned to Russia three cruisers captured in the 
Russo-Japanese War. The vessels subsequently rejoined the Russian Baltic Fleet.[ 55] Also, 
Japanese factories supplied arms and munitions to Russia and Great Britain.[ 56] In 1917, 
Japanese shipyards hastily constructed (in five months) twelve destroyers identical to the 
Japanese Kaba class for France; Japanese sailors delivered the ships to French forces in the 
Mediterranean.[ 57] In December 1916, the British chancellor of the exchequer sought and 
gained the War Cabinet's approval for the purchase of six Japanese merchant ships, totaling 
77,500 tons.[ 58] The British further requested in May 1917 that the Japanese supply shipping 
for Chinese workers recruited to work in Europe; Japanese warships helped to escort the convoys 
to France.[ 59] Later in the war, Japan and the United States agreed that Japanese shipyards 
would produce 371,000 tons of shipping for the U.S. Shipping Board. Although the war ended 
before the merchant vessels were complete, Japan willingly helped in this effort, according to an 
American account.[ 60] Moreover, the Japanese government agreed to charter an ever-growing 
portion of Japan's merchant fleet for allied use.[ 61]  
In contrast to this lucrative charter and construction work, persistent British attempts to purchase 
Japanese warships as replacements for Royal Navy losses irritated the Japanese government and 
stung Japanese pride. Fearing further raids on the English coast by swift units of the German 
navy, Admiral Jellicoe proposed in mid-1917 that Great Britain purchase two battle cruisers from 
the Japanese. He doubted that the Japanese could be persuaded simply to deploy ships to join the 
Grand Fleet--adding, in a revealing slight, "Even if they did, it is doubtful whether they would be 
a match for German battle-cruisers when fully manned by Japanese."[ 62] The government in 
Tokyo rejected either selling the warships or sending them to serve with the Grand Fleet.[ 63] 
However, the service later rendered by the Japanese flotilla in the Mediterranean may have 
caused Jellicoe to reappraise his low estimate of Japanese capabilities.  
Japanese Assistance to the United States  
A major (and in light of later events, particularly ironic) upshot of the Japanese wartime naval 
relationship with Great Britain was a similar, if much smaller, relationship with the United 
States. In effect, the Imperial Japanese Navy now extended further, if roundabout, aid to the 
Royal Navy by making it possible for the U.S. Navy to assist the British directly. The Royal 
Navy's most pressing lack at this point was escort ships; it importuned the Americans to help 
make good that shortage. Doing so meant shifting U.S. naval forces to the Atlantic from the 
Pacific, which produced for the Americans a shortfall of their own in the latter theater. To fill it, 
they, like the British in 1914, approached their new Pacific ally, Japan.  
American intervention in the war required a complete rethinking of American naval strategy and 
construction policies, which before 1917 had assumed an allied defeat followed by an attack by 
German and Japanese forces against the United States. Shortly after the American entry into the 
war, a British mission headed by Arthur Balfour sought to alter the American naval construction 
program, which then called for a massive buildup of capital warships (in part to remain capable 
of fighting a German-Japanese combination).[ 64] In April and May 1917, Balfour entered into 
secret discussions with American officials, including Woodrow Wilson's personal emissary, 
Colonel Edward M. House. The British proposed that the Americans construct large numbers of 
desperately needed escort ships in return for a promise of British help in case of a Japanese-
American conflict. The two parties ultimately deferred such an agreement for fear of offending 
Japan, which remained an important ally of Great Britain even at this late stage of the war.[ 65] 
Nonetheless, that these negotiations occurred shows the depth of Anglo-American antipathy and 
mistrust toward Japan in 1917.  
American leaders viewed their relations with Japan through a prism of concern about China and 
racial bigotry. James Reed writes that before the First World War, "Pacific coast politicians; 
labor union leaders; Hearst chain journalists (whose idea of news embraced lovely white 
maidens found dead in the flea-bag hotels of debauched Japanese); and, perhaps not least of all, 
the Navy officer corps, whose War Plan Orange was really a war plan yellow," were sources of 
anti-Japanese feeling in the United States. Such feelings joined with the American "Open Door" 
policy concerning China to turn American opinion against Japan. American leaders viewed 
Japan as seeking unfair territorial and political advantage in China, a state known to most 
Americans only through the eyes of the many missionaries serving there.[ 66]  
American entry into the First World War dictated a renewed attempt to resolve the impasse in 
American-Japanese relations. Like Great Britain at the beginning of the war, the United States 
now found itself dependent on Japanese good will and assistance in the Pacific. A Japanese 
mission to Washington led by Ishii Kikujiro concluded an agreement that permitted American 
warships to redeploy to the Atlantic and support the British fleet.[ 67] Under that secret 
agreement, Japanese warships patrolled the waters of the Hawaiian Islands for the remainder of 
the conflict. The cruiser Tokiwa replaced the last major American warship in the Pacific, the 
armored cruiser USS Saratoga, at Honolulu in October 1917, allowing the ship to join the U.S. 
naval forces in the Atlantic. The cruiser Asama replaced the Tokiwa in August 1918 and 
protected commerce in Hawaiian waters until it returned to Japan in February 1919.[ 68]  
Despite the cooperative manner in which the Japanese extended their wartime responsibilities, 
American resentment of dependence upon the Japanese throughout the war and of Japanese gains 
in Micronesia closely paralleled that seen in British quarters.[ 69] The Japanese returned this 
antagonism after 1917, when the view took root among naval officers that differences between 
the two powers were irreconcilable short of war. Japanese expansion into Siberia in 1918, seen 
by some Japanese as preempting American containment on all sides, was to add to the antipathy 
between the two nations. By 1917, even while acting as an ally, the Japanese navy had officially 
designated the United States its "most likely enemy" in any future conflict.[ 70]  
Operations in the Mediterranean  
In early 1917, Japan finally deployed forces to the European theater of operations. The lead 
Japanese warships departed Singapore under the command of Admiral Sato Kozo for the 
Mediterranean on 11 March. Sato sailed for Malta with the cruiser Akashi and destroyers Ume, 
Kusunoki, Kaede, Katsura, Kashiwa, Matsu, Sugi, and Sakaki, which collectively constituted the 
Tenth and Eleventh Destroyer Flotillas. The task force hunted German raiders while crossing the 
Indian Ocean, arriving at Aden on 4 April. On 10 April Sato agreed to an urgent British request 
to escort the Saxon, an English troop transport; it sailed from Port Said to Malta guarded by Ume 
and Kusunoki. The remainder of the Japanese squadron quickly followed and commenced 
operations against German and Austrian submarines threatening allied shipping in the 
Mediterranean.[ 71]  
The Tenth and Eleventh Flotillas reached Malta at the nadir of allied fortunes in the 
Mediterranean.[ 72] Of the approximately twelve million British registered tons (BRT) of 
shipping lost during the war, 3,096,109 tons fell prey to mines and submarines in the 
Mediterranean. From February until December of 1917, allied shipping losses worldwide 
amounted to 2,566 ships, or 5,753,751 BRT, 48 percent of wartime losses.[ 73] Allied losses in 
the Mediterranean in April 1917 totaled 218,000 tons, 7 percent of the total sinkings there during 
the entire war.[ 74] Desperately short of escorts, the allies seriously considered the ideas of 
reducing the number of ships transiting the Mediterranean by sending them on the safer passage 
around the Cape of Good Hope, and of evacuating the British contingent at Salonika.[ 75]  
The arrival of Sato's cruiser and eight destroyers did not by itself tip the scales toward the allies 
in the Mediterranean. Nonetheless, the task given the Japanese squadron was an important one--
protecting troop transports shifting vital reinforcements to France after the bloody offensives at 
Arras, Chemin des Dames, and in the Champagne.[ 76] The appearance of Japanese escorts at 
Malta permitted the allied command to speed the passage of transports. Japanese vessels escorted 
the transports directly from Egypt to France without stopping at Malta except when convoys 
formed at that port.[ 77]  
The destroyers Sakaki and Matsu and other Japanese warships participated in the dramatic rescue 
of troops from the torpedoed transport Transylvania on 4 May 1917. Some 413 men died in this 
tragedy off the French coast, but Japanese, French, and Italian naval forces saved most of the 
three thousand troops despite the danger of further torpedo attack. The Times History of the War 
reported that "the Admiralty sent a telegram of thanks and congratulation to the Japanese admiral 
in the Mediterranean for the splendid work of rescue performed by the Japanese on this 
occasion."[ 78]  
The Japanese navy relieved the Akashi in June 1917 with the armored cruiser Izumo and 
reinforced the Malta squadron with the destroyers Kashi, Hinoki, Momo, and Yanagi. As the 
tempo of antisubmarine operations in the Mediterranean accelerated, Japanese sailors 
temporarily manned two British gunboats, which they designated the Tokyo and Saikyo, and two 
British destroyers, renamed the Kanran and Sendan. At peak strength in 1917, the Japanese 
Mediterranean flotilla numbered seventeen warships.[ 79]  
By late summer of 1917, British doubts about the competence and value of the Japanese 
warships, doubts initially expressed by such officers as Captain George P. W. Hope, director of 
the Operations Division of the Admiralty War Staff, had vanished. On 21 August Admiral 
George A. Ballard, Senior Naval Officer-in-Charge at Malta, reported to the Admiralty that the 
Japanese had rendered invaluable service in escorting troop transports since their arrival at 
Malta. He reminded the Admiralty that until the Imperial Japanese Navy destroyers had arrived 
the allies had been short of escorts for this vital duty. Ballard praised the operational capacity of 
the Japanese:  
French standards of efficiency are certainly lower than British, however, and Italian standards 
are lower still. With the Japanese it is otherwise. Admiral Sato's destroyers are kept in a highly 
serviceable condition and spend at least as large a proportion of their time at sea as our own, 
which is far from being the case with the French and Italian vessels of any class. The Japanese 
moreover are very independent in all matters of administration and supply whereas the French 
will never do anything for themselves if they can get it done for them.[ 80]  
Japanese efficiency meant many more days spent at sea than the warships of other British allies, 
multiplying the impact of the Japanese contribution to the Mediterranean war effort.  
The importance of Japanese escorts dramatically increased when in 1918 the Germans launched 
their spring offensive on the western front. The British responded with further large movements 
of troops from the Middle East to Marseilles. Japanese units escorted more than a hundred 
thousand British troops directly across the Mediterranean during the critical months of April and 
May. After the crisis ended, Japanese warships convoyed troops from Egypt to Salonika in 
support of the allied fall 1918 offensive. By the end of the war the squadron had accompanied 
788 allied ships across the Mediterranean, including transports conveying seven hundred 
thousand troops to the fighting fronts. In thirty-four engagements with German and Austrian 
submarines the Japanese suffered damage to two destroyers, Matsu and, as we have seen, 
Sakaki.[ 81]  
Japanese naval forces remained in European waters until May 1919. After the armistice, units of 
Admiral Sato's Second Special Mission Squadron helped supervise the Central Powers' 
surrendered fleets. The cruiser Izumo and destroyers Hinoki and Yanagi sailed from Malta to 
Scapa Flow to help guard the German fleet and prepare for the return to Japan of seven 
surrendered German submarines.  
Sato dispatched the destroyers Katsura, Matsu, Sakaki, and Kaede to Brindisi to aid in 
supervising German and Austro-Hungarian ships surrendering in the Mediterranean. He then 
rode the cruiser Nisshin, with the eight remaining destroyers, to Constantinople in December 
1918. Detaching the destroyers Kashiwa, Kanran, and Sendan (the latter two would be returned 
to the Royal Navy in 1919) to superintend enemy warships at Constantinople, the balance of the 
squadron returned to Malta, where it received new orders from Japan to escort German 
submarines from England back home as part of Japan's war spoils. Sending the Ume and 
Kusunoki to the Adriatic for patrol duty, Sato left for England, gathering the remaining Japanese 
escorts on the way.  
The Japanese squadron made Portland, England, on 5 January 1919. The Izumo, Hinoki, Yanagi, 
and the seven German U-boats joined Sato's fleet, which then returned at the end of March to 
Malta, where it was rejoined by the Ume and Kusunoki. The tender Kwanto serviced the U-boats 
at Malta then joined the cruiser Nisshin and two destroyer flotillas in escorting the submarines to 
Japan. All reached Yokosuka without incident on 18 June 1919. The Izumo and the last destroyer 
detachment left Malta on April 10 for various ports, including Naples, Genoa, and Marseilles, 
and a final trip to Malta on May 5. The warships left ten days later for the voyage to Japan, 
reaching Yokosuka on 2 July 1919.[ 82]  
"God Grant Our Alliance ... May Long Endure"  
British leaders had nothing but praise for the Japanese Mediterranean squadron before it sailed 
for home. Winston Churchill voiced the general high opinion when he said he "did not think that 
the Japanese [squadron] had ever done a foolish thing." The governor of Malta, Lord Methuen, 
who reviewed Japanese warships there in March 1919, also lauded the Japanese navy for "its 
splendid work in European waters" and expressed the hope, "God grant our alliance, cemented in 
blood, may long endure."[ 83]  
The Japanese warships' performance in the Mediterranean certainly merited high praise. Japanese 
destroyers' ratio of time at sea to time in port was the highest of any allied warships during the 
war:  
Japanese warships were under way 72 percent of the time. The British record was 60 percent, the 
Greek and French only 45 percent. British officers credited the Japanese warships with excellent 
performance--at least, they added, when all went according to plan. Postwar British criticisms 
that the Japanese "acted inferior to our men when unforeseen situations cropped up" reflect 
British prejudices expressed during the war, prejudices not supported by the actual record. That 
record clearly demonstrates instead how seriously Japanese naval officers took their duty. The 
commanders of several Japanese warships are reported to have committed Hari-Kari when ships 
they were convoying were lost.[ 84]  
Still, why did the British so quickly forget Japan's assistance to the allied cause, not only in the 
Mediterranean Sea but in the Pacific and Indian Oceans? (See Table 2.) Why did the British 
permit the Anglo-Japanese alliance to lapse in 1921? The most obvious reason was that the end 
of the war simplified the situation in the Pacific. The lack of a common foe removed the main 
justification for the alliance. With the German threat to Britain's Far East possessions eliminated 
and the nascent Soviet Union no longer threatening India, the crown jewel of the Empire, Great 
Britain did not require Japan's naval cooperation. American pressure pushed the British into an 
adversarial relationship with the Japanese, whose new island possessions sat astride American 
communications with the Philippines and Guam. Prewar racial and diplomatic animosity 
between Japan and the United States, set aside in 1917 and 1918, quickly reemerged despite 
wartime Japanese assistance to the United States in the Pacific. Japan's valuable role as an ally 
never appeared in Western histories of the war.  
At home, some Japanese politicians reacted badly to Western treatment of Japan during the war 
and at Versailles. As early as April 1917, and understanding that the allied public knew little or 
nothing of Japan's contributions, Japanese diplomats had offered the British a memorandum for 
publication in allied newspapers.[ 85] Many resented how at Versailles the "three Great Powers 
acted as judges" in a confrontation with Chinese delegates over the Japanese occupation of 
Shantung. The apparent hostility toward Japan after the war, despite its service, led an increasing 
number of Japanese military officers to believe in an American and British conspiracy against 
Japan, founded on racial animosity.[ 86]  
The severing of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, in fact, steered Japan toward cooperation with 
Germany. The arrival of the seized German submarines began a new, long-term relationship 
between the Japanese and German navies. German influence and technology quickly supplanted 
those of the British. The two services began to exchange personnel. Numerous Japanese officers 
received training in Germany in the 1920s and 1930s, facilitating the Imperial Japanese Navy's 
ultimate break with its British mentors.[ 87]  
The British had their empire, and the Americans felt no shame in professing their "Manifest 
Destiny," but both attacked Japanese imperial ambitions as excessive. After 1918, neither nation 
proved willing to maintain the close naval cooperation with Japan that had benefited all parties 
during the First World War. So it was that despite the strong record of Japanese assistance to 
Great Britain during that conflict, the true legacy of that cooperation proved to be alienation. 
Thus began the breach between East and West that led to the Japanese attack upon British (and 
American) possessions in the Far East as part of a true two-ocean conflict, just twenty-three 
years after Japan, Great Britain, and the United States had been allies in the "war to end all 
wars."  
* All Japanese names in this article are given in the customary Japanese style, family name first.  
Table 1 Strength of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1914-1918  
                    1914      1915      1916      1917      1918 
 
Battleships &         14        17        14        16        16 
Battle Cruisers 
Armored Cruisers      13        12        12        12        12 
Older Cruisers        10         9         8         7         7 
Light Cruisers                   3         3         3        33 
Destroyers            50        59        63        65        71 
Total                 90       100       100       103       109 
Table 2 Japanese Warships Serving during the First World War  
Legend for Chart: 
 
A - Major Warships & Classes in IJN Service, 
    1914-18 (year completed) 
B - Type 
C - Tonnage & Speed (knots) 
 
A                      B            C 
 
Mikasa (1902)         BB       15,179 
                                   18 
 
Tango (1898)          BB       11,400        Captured Jan 1905, 
 (ex-Poltava)                      17        returned to Russia, 
                                             Mar 1916 
 
Sagami (1901)         BB       13,500        Captured Jan 1905, 
 (ex-Peresviet)                    18        Sagami returned 
                                             to Russia, Mar 1916 
 
Suo (1902) 
 (ex-Pobieda) 
 
Hizen (1902)          BB       12,902        Captured Jan 1905 
 (ex-Retvizan)                     18 
 
Iwami (1904)          BB       15,300        Captured at 
 (ex-Orel) 18                                Tsushima, 
                                             May 1905 
 
Kashimi (1906)        BB       17,200        Last BBs built 
 Katori (1906                  16,663        outside Japan 
                                 18.5 
 
Satsuma (1906)        BB       19,700        First large warship 
                                18.25        built in Japan, 
                                             semi-dreadnought 
 
Aki (1911)            BB       21,800        Similar to Satsuma 
                                   20 
 
Kawachi (1912)        BB       21,900        Kawachi lost to 
 Settsu (1912)                     21        mag. explosion, 
                                             12 Jul 1918 
 
Fuso (1915)           BB       35,900        Considered 
 Yamashiro (1917)                  28        super-dreadnoughts 
 
Ise (1917)            BB       36,500        Ise completed 15 
 Hyuga (1918)                    23.5        Dec 1917, Hyuga 30 
                                             Apr 1918 
 
Kongo (1913)          BC       32,200        "First true BCs," 
 Hiei (1914)                      27.5       Haruna damaged by 
 Kirishima (1915)                            mine laid by Get. 
 Haruna (1915)                               aux. cruiser Wolf 
                                             in S. Pac., 1917 
 
Wakamiya (1901)       AV        7,720        Captured 12 Jan 
 (ex-freighter                    9.5        1905, converted to 
 Lethington)                                 AV, 1908 
 
Chiyoda (1890)        CA        2,400        2d Class def. ship 
                                   18        in WWI 
 
Asama (1899)          CA       10,519        Asama wrecked San 
 Tokiwa (1899)                   21.3        Bartoleme Bay 
                                             31 Jan 1915, 
                                             restored 1917 
 
Azuma (1900)          CA        9,953        Training ship in 
                                   21        1914 
 
Yakumo (1900)         CA       10,288        Built in Germany 
                                   20 
 
Izumo (1900)          CA       10,305 
 Iwate (1901)                  10,235 
                                20.75 
 
Kasuga (1903)         CA        8,591        Built in Italy, 
 Nisshin (1904)                 8,384        sold to Argentina, 
                                 20.6        resold to Japan 
                                             1903-1904 
 
Aso (1903)            CA        7,726        Captured 1905, 
 (ex-Bayan)                        21        joined IJN 1908 
 
Tsukuba (1907)        CA       15,400        Tsukuba sunk by 
 Ikoma (1908)                    20.5        mag. explosion, 
                                             14 Jan 1917 
 
Kurami (1911)         CA       15,595        Rerated as BC 
                                21.25        in 1921 
Ibuki (1909)                     22.5 
 
Takachiyo (1886)      CL        4,150        Minelayer after 
                                   18        1907, sunk by Ger. 
                                             TB S-90 18 Oct 
                                             1914, off Tsingtao 
 
Suma (1896)           CL        2,657        3d-class cruisers, 
                                   20        first armored 
Akashi (1899)                    19.5        warships built in 
                                             dom. yards by dom. 
                                             plans 
 
Kasagi (1898)         CL        6,066        2d-class cruisers, 
                                 22.7        bought from U.S. 
Chitose (1899)                  5,598        in gratitude for 
                                 22.9        neutrality in 1905 
 
Niitaka (1904)        CL        3,716        3d-class cruisers 
 Tsushima (1904)                   20 
 
Otowa (1904)          CL        3,388        3d-class cruiser, 
                                   21        wrecked 25 Jul 1917 
 
Soya (1900)           CL        6,500        Returned to Russia, 
 (ex-Varyag)                       23        Mar 1916 
 
Tone (1910)           CL        1,250 
                                   22 
 
Chikuma (1912)        CL        5,040        Carried 8 6-inch 
 Hirado (1912)                     26        guns 
 Yahagi (1912) 
 
Aotaka class          TB          152        11 in class; used 
 (1903-1904)                       28        until 1921-22 
 
Akebono (1899)        DD          410        Ikazuchi class had 
 Oboro (1900)                      31        6 units, 3 left by 
 Sazanami (1900)                             WWI 
 
Murakumo (1899)       DD          361        Murakumo class had 
 Yugure (1899)                     30        6 units; Shinonome 
 Shiranui (1899)                             lost in typhoon in 
 Kagero (1900)                               1913 
 Usugumo (1900) 
 
Shirakumo (1902)      DD          428 
 Asashio (1902)                    31 
 
Murasame (1903)       DD          234        Harasume class; 2 
 Asagiri (1903)                    29        units lost before 
 Ariake (1905)                               WWI; 3d-class DD 
 Arare (1905) 
 Fubuki (1905) 
 
Asakaze class         DD          234        Almost identical to 
(1905-1909)                        29        Harasume class; 
(32 ships)                                   Shirotae lost to 
                                             Ger. shore 
                                             batteries, and to 
                                             Jaguar (gunboat) 
                                             3 Sep 1914; one 
                                             unit lost before 
                                             WWI 
 
Yamabiko (1902)       DD          240        Broken up in 1917 
(ex-Russian)                     27.5 
 
Sakura (1912)         2d-class    830        First 
 Tachibana (1912)     DD           30        Japanese-designed 
                                             DDs 
 
Kaba class (1915)     2d-class    850        Same design used 
 Kaba DD                           30        for construction of 
 Matsu                                       French Algerien or 
 Kashiwa                                     Arabe class. Sakaki 
 Katsura                                     torpedoed by 
 Kaede                                       Austrlian U-27, 11 
 Kiri                                        Jun 1917 NE of 
 Kusunoki                                    Cengotto, repaired 
 Ume 
 Sakaki 
 Sugi 
 
Momo class (1916)     2d-class  1,080 
 Momo                 DD         31.5 
 Kashi 
 Hinoki 
 Yanagi 
 
Enoki class (1918)    DD        1,100        Comparable with 
 Enoki                           31.5        Momo class 
 Nara 
 Tsubaki 
 Kuwa 
 Keyaki 
 Maki 
 
Sendan                DD          740        British 'H' or 
 (ex-Minstrel)                     27        Acorn class DDs 
 Kanran                                      transferred to 
 (ex-Nemesis)                                Japan in 1917 in 
                                             Mediterranean, 
                                             returned by Japan 
                                             in 1919 
Note: Japan received the old coastal defense ship Torgud Reis (ex-Weissenburg), the BB Nassau 
(1909), and Oldenburg (1912) as reparations. It never took over Torgud Reis. Two other ships 
were broken up at Dordrecht for scrap in 1921. Japan received the ex-German CL Augsburg, 
also scrapped at Dordrecht, 1922, and the destroyers T/V. 181, S. 51, S.60, V. 80, V127 as 
reparations. All were broken up at Dordrecht or in Great Britain. (Compiled from a variety of 
sources.)  
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